



Looking at the Stars: Status shifts after collective achievements

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ABSTRACT

We analyze how collective awards shape status shifts within teams. Integrating the relational and the public recognition perspectives on status formation, we argue that status shifts arise from both internal team composition and external recognition. The presence of a high-status member amplifies audience arousal, leading to a disproportionate attribution of the award's value. This heightened arousal also strengthens audience memory, resulting in more persistent status gains for all team members. Our analysis is grounded in the film industry and based on a sample of 6,632 actor-film pairs related to the period 2000–2013. Results show that all team members experience a positive status shift after receiving a collective award. However, high-status members experience a higher positive status shift compared to the others. Results highlight that the positive status shifts due to the collective award winning tend to last after some time, in the presence of high-status members in the team.

1. Introduction

Status hierarchies shape access to resources and opportunities (Blau, 1994), making the mechanisms that drive positive status shifts a central concern in status research (e.g. Jensen & Kim, 2015; Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016; Reschke et al., 2018; Gorji, 2020). While prior studies emphasize that awards or high ratings can elevate individual status (Zhao & Zhou, 2011), the status implications of collective awards — those recognizing joint achievements rather than individual contributions — remain largely unexplored. This is particularly striking given the prominence of collective awards in various fields, from the Academy Award for Best Picture to best paper awards in academic settings.

This gap is theoretically significant, as collective awards inherently involve relational dynamics within teams. When a team receives an award, status implications stem not only from external recognition but also from the team's internal composition (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010), especially the potential presence of high- and low-status members within the team. Accordingly, in team contexts, the dynamics of status shifts require a more complex theoretical approach, incorporating both information on the team internal composition and external recognition, as, at the team level, status is not only due to the individual's position in a social hierarchy but also to the interplay between team members of differing status levels. More specifically, we argue that receiving a collective award introduces a dual layer of influence: external recognition

prompts status shifts, while internal composition of the team — such as the presence or not of high-status individuals — shape how these changes impact each team member. Extant literature falls short in explaining how team member status changes in these cases. Existing research on awards often highlights an overshadowing effect, where the prominence of a high-status team member (i.e. a star member) diminishes recognition for other team members (Merton, 1968). In contrast, the relational view suggests potential positive spillovers for non-star members linked to high-status teammates (Jensen, 2008; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999). This paper seeks to reconcile these perspectives by examining what and why are there differences between star and non-star team members in terms of status shifts associated with winning a collective award. Drawing on collective memory theory (Halbwachs, 1925; Hirst et al., 2018), we argue that the collective nature of awards, which draws attention to team composition, can mitigate the overshadowing effect of the star presence, leading to positive status shifts for other team members as well. More specifically, when audiences process information about a collective award, i.e. considering both the award and team composition as a composite whole, the focus is on the piece of information with the highest level of arousal, i.e. the information activating the collective memory in response to a stimulus (Eysenck, 1976), while limiting attention to the others. At the same time, however, the presence of a piece of information with a high level of arousal may favor the storing of the information in the audience

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collective memory and thus can make status shifts more durable. As a direct consequence, we argue that when a high-status individual is included in a team granted with collective awards, it is likely that the social group will selectively focus (mainly) on this arousal information, when updating the status hierarchy. If so, the information about the presence of the high-status team member is more likely to be processed and, accordingly, the credits for the collective awards are disproportionately granted to this individual. However, the presence of the high-status individual, by facilitating the storing of the information in the collective memory may make status shifts more durable for all team members.

Our empirical setting is the film industry, where elite screen actors often work together with less famous colleagues (Elberse, 2007) and where the granting of collective awards is a common and relevant practice. The film industry has also been the elective testbed of a variety of studies on status (e.g. Perretti & Negro, 2006), thus facilitating the comparison of our results with prior literature. For this study, we collected information about the films produced, from 2000 to 2013, by the eight major film studios. For each film, we kept track of any collective awards (e.g. best movie, best ensemble cast) assigned by the leading US and European professional societies and festivals (Cattani et al., 2013). Results show that cast members, on average, experience a positive status shift when the film is granted with collective awards. However, these positive status shifts are higher for high-status individuals (i.e. star actors) compared to the other cast members. Therefore, contrary to what could be expected from extrapolation of prior research on status, we show that individuals affiliated to a star and concurrently receiving collective awards experience a limited positive status shift. Findings also highlight that the positive status shifts due to the reception of collective awards tend to last after some time, in the presence of a star in the cast.

This article contributes to the literature on team-level variations of status by showing that status shifts may last in time when associated to arousal information as the presence of a star in the cast. Second, focusing on how the audience process composite information, the results of this study provide a deeper understanding of how collective awards imply a status shift for team members.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Status and status formation

It is widely accepted that status is a valuable asset for accessing survival resources (Podolny et al., 1996; Sauder et al., 2012) and it is proven to entail several advantages in terms of economic performances (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001). Past research has pointed out, for instance, that CEOs receive higher compensations for their work when they are perceived to have higher status compared to their middle managers (Belliveau et al., 1996). Similarly, high-status financial analysts attain higher personal returns compared to lower-status colleagues (Bowers and Prato, 2018; Prato and Ferraro, 2018). A shared rationale for this dynamic is that high-status individuals are perceived as trustworthy potential exchange partners. Accordingly, they may engage a larger pool of interested counterparts and, therefore, experience lower costs for searching partners (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010) and forming new business relationships (Messeni Petruzzelli, 2019). Being perceived as trustworthy also reduces the cost related to the offering of collaterals for high-status individuals (Podolny, 1993).

Given the importance of status for individuals and organizations, a vibrant, lively, and dynamic debate aiming at explaining how status can be achieved has emerged over time (Piazza and Castellucci, 2014). A central thesis of this literature is that the dynamics of status formation are deeply influenced by the status of the entities with whom individuals affiliate (Long et al., 1998; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Jensen et al., 2021). This relational view advocates that individuals who connect to high-status entities typically experience a positive status shift. By

contrast, those who are linked to low-status individuals suffer from penalization through a lowering of their status (Jensen and Roy, 2008). Following this view, high-status entities tend to affiliate with homophilous counterparts, especially as market uncertainty increases (Podolny, 1994). Prior literature, however, is not exempt of counterexamples. Castellucci and Ertug (2010) showed that, in the Formula One context, high-status entities often affiliate with lower-status counterparts if they are able to extract an economic rent from such relations, which overcompensates the penalties generated by the affiliation with a low-status individual.

Aside this relational view, a second strand of research on the dynamics of status formation concentrates on the role of third-party arbiters (e.g. Anand and Watson, 2004; Perretti and Negro, 2006). These studies linked individuals' status increase to the reception of public recognitions, such as an award (Jensen and Kim, 2015) or a high rating (Zhao and Zhou, 2011), rather than to the affiliation with high-status entities. Studies in this tradition argued that winning an important award (e.g. a Nobel Prize or an Academy Award) implies a sudden positive status shift (Jensen and Kim, 2015), which allows individuals to experience a symbolic attestation of quality that is difficult to obtain otherwise (Sauder, 2006). Thanks to this attestation, individuals are thus able to ascend the status hierarchy (Rossman et al., 2010). Scholars have shown that third-party evaluations influence the status position of those being judged (Sauder, 2006), especially in cultural and creative industries (Caves, 2000), given the experiential nature of traded goods (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Lampel et al., 2000). This is the case of fine arts (White and White, 1993), entertainment (Perretti and Negro, 2006), and the food industry (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999), where the awarding is typically organized in symbolic ceremonies, often taking the form of public spectacles (e.g. the Grammy Award night), to capture collective attention and make the distribution of status collectively known (Anand and Watson, 2004).

While it is clear that high-status affiliations and public recognition, taken separately enhance the status position of a focal individual, we know less about their effect when jointly considered. We are inclined to believe this gap is particularly compelling, considering that normally individuals work in teams (Stewart, 2006). Thereby, it is common that the reference social group that forms status hierarchy receives information about individuals' affiliation and public recognition together. Occasionally, this occurs by construction, such as in the case of collective awards (e.g. Academy Award for Best Picture or the UEFA Champions League victory), where not only an individual but the whole team is awarded together for a collective output (Cattani et al., 2013).

The literature on status and teams has primarily examined how status differences among team members shape various team dynamics, such as exploration, knowledge sharing, and performance. For instance, Perretti and Negro (2006) examine how status differentiation influences exploration in team design, showing that middle-status members are less likely to engage in exploration, while high- and low-status members are more prone to introducing newcomers and forming new team compositions. Similarly, Hays et al. (2022) investigate the interplay between power and status differentiation in teams, finding that power differentiation can harm team performance when status differentiation is high, as it increases knowledge hiding and fosters a competitive team climate. Bunderson et al. (2014) highlight the importance of status in shaping the integration of new team members, demonstrating that status is often inertial — i.e. roles within teams acquire status value, which affects how newcomers are perceived and their ability to contribute. Cohen and Zhou (1991) provide further evidence of how both internal team dynamics and broader organizational and societal status characteristics influence interaction patterns within long-term work groups. Additionally, Bendersky and Shah (2012) explore the consequences of status changes over time, showing that individuals who gain status in teams often experience performance declines, likely due to the cognitive and behavioral effort required to assert and maintain their new status. Finally, Slavova et al. (2016) analyze how the arrival of new scientists

affects incumbent team members, revealing that learning and social comparison mechanisms drive performance outcomes depending on prior team composition. While these studies offer valuable insights into the role of status in shaping team interactions and outcomes, little research has examined how status is actively formed within teams over time, particularly in response to external recognition such as collective awards. This study seeks to address this gap by investigating how team composition influences individual status shifts when the team as a whole receives external recognition. To this aim, we develop a theory explaining the dynamics of status formation when new composite information is provided to a reference social group.

2.2. The reception of stimuli and the changes in status hierarchy

Prior literature has highlighted that, to effectively serve as a signal, status requires that a social group updates the status hierarchy when new information about an individual arrives (Piazza and Castellucci, 2014). Thus, to appreciate how status changes due to collective achievements, we focus our attention on understanding how a group collectively updates the status hierarchy when new information is available. Studies on collective memory suggested that social groups possess a shared pool of knowledge and information that they update when new information arrives (Peltokorpi, 2008). When the upcoming information is related to either the affiliation with a high-status individual or the reception of an award, the group can easily process the information and derive an individual's advancement in the social hierarchy. These instances have been widely discussed in extant literature. For instance, Merton (1968) showed that scientists who receive a Nobel prize are given disproportionate credit in cases of independent multiple discoveries, with respect to other scientists. Similarly, Rossman et al. (2010) demonstrated that being affiliated with high-status actors makes it more likely for other actors to have their own contribution endorsed with an Oscar nomination. Indeed, when an individual receives an award or the affiliation with high-status counterparts becomes publicly known, this stimulus is processed by the social group thus causing an advancement of the individual in the status hierarchy. A similar reasoning can be extended to collective awards. The granting of collective awards is typically organized in public ceremonies (Levy, 2001; Rossman et al., 2010), with media coverage that extends well beyond the event (Gemser et al., 2008). Accordingly, the information on collective awards represents a visible (Anand & Watson, 2004; McCullough & Conway III, 2018) stimulus that the reference social group will likely process. However, unlike the case of individual awards, where the reference social group can directly associate the award to an individual, the collective nature of the awards under investigation makes it more difficult the processing of the stimulus, since it encompasses an information related to the reception of the awards and another about the composition of the team (Pollock et al., 2019).

The literature has noted that, when presented with such complex information, a reference social group feels uncertainty and attempts to obtain additional information before processing the stimulus (Berlyne, 1970; Hochberg, 1998; Desender et al., 2018). If information is not available, the social group heuristically processes the stimulus (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Rand, 2016). In this case, a long-lasting tradition in social psychology has highlighted that merit (or even blame) is assigned to the whole collective. Instances of this behavior are very common in literature, particularly in the case of collective guilt (see e.g. Branscombe, 2004; Solak et al., 2017). Yet, also positive cases have been discussed, such as recognition for class groupworks (Johnston and Miles, 2004; Govender, 2018) and project-based businesses (Hobday, 2000; Thurkow et al., 2000).

Following this literature, in the absence of any other information (e.g. public information that a team member did not contribute to the collective achievement), we expect that the reference social group members assign the merits of the collective awards to all team members. Accordingly, the reception of collective awards should imply a positive

status shift for all team members. Moreover, considering that more collective awards are likely to enforce the stimuli received by the reference social group, we expect the higher the number of collective awards received, the greater the positive status shift for all team members. Thus, our baseline hypothesis is that:

Hypothesis 1. *After the reception of collective awards, team members experience a positive status shift.*

If the team includes a high-status individual, the dynamics through which groups form their memory are likely affected. Specifically, high-status individuals, by occupying a prominent position in the status hierarchy and being more familiar for group members compared to lower-status ones, generate excitement and enthusiasm that can bring to an emotionally arousal experience (Lewis, 2016). The literature has noted that the presence of stimuli with high levels of arousal affect information processing so that often disproportionate attention is paid to the source of arousal, while other relevant information is downplayed (Bornstein et al., 1998). This may result in enhanced memory for central details and less memory for peripheral ones (Burke et al., 1992; Sharot and Phelps, 2004), such as in the case of the weapon focus effect (Hulse and Memon, 2006), in which witnesses to a crime remember the gun or knife vividly, but other details, such as the perpetrator's clothing or vehicle, are given less focus (Tooley et al., 1987). Even in less extreme cases, scholars have noted that emotionally arousing stimuli benefit of prioritized processing (Raymond et al., 1992). Thus, when the number of stimuli is large, arousing ones are likely to be processed (Kensinger, 2004) for longer time (Reschke et al., 2018).

Following this line of reasoning, when a high-status individual is part of a team, the reference social group may prioritize the processing of this information, while reducing the attention to other team members. In this scenario, because attention narrows to the high-status individual, the social group disproportionately associates the collective awards with this individual. Support to the idea that high-status individuals get an extra amount of credit is provided by several prior works, which show that high-status individuals are evaluated, and thus rewarded, more positively than lower-status ones for a same contribution (Verhulst et al., 2010). For instance, it has been shown that group members perceive high-status individuals as being more influential, more technically competent, and tend to ascribe them the achievement of the team (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, & Cohen, 1972; Ridgeway & Berger, 1986; Ridgeway & Correll, 2006). Moreover, prior studies noted that in instances of simultaneous discovery, high-status scientists tend to receive a much greater share of recognition than low-status scientists, who have a legitimate claim to having made a near identical discovery at the same time (Merton, 1968). In some fields, the ability of high-status individuals to obtain most (if not all) of the credit for an achievement is known as the "winner-take-all" compensation effect (De Vany and Walls, 1999; Ravid, 1999). This dynamic is well known in several different contexts. For instance, it is quite common in team sports, where a high-status individual often takes most of the recognition for collective wins. This is the case of Peyton Manning in the winning of Indianapolis Colts Super Bowl XLI title (Ross and Nisbett, 2011), Diego Armando Maradona during the 1986 FIFA World Cup with the Argentina national football team (Salazar-Sutil, 2008), and Michael Jordan during Chicago Bulls domain in the NBA tournament in the early nineties (Halberstam, 2012). Furthermore, similar dynamics are noted in the film industry. A notable example of this phenomenon is related to the 1998 film *Saving Private Ryan*, which won 23 and was nominated for 16 best film awards. The leading actor in the film is Tom Hanks, who had previously won two Academy Awards for Best Actor in 1994 and 1995 (respectively, with *Philadelphia* and *Forrest Gump*). Tom Hanks captured the attention and was particularly praised by critics, to the point that he got most of the merits for the success of the film. Opposite is the case of the South Korean 2019 film *Parasite*, that has been awarded with numerous accolades as Best Film. In fact, the main actors in *Parasite* were not familiar for a large share of Hollywood film

audience, therefore no one of them 'stole the show' with respect to others. Indeed, the whole cast has been well regarded by critics and this is testified also by the several Best Ensemble awards won by *Parasite* (e.g. Andrews, 2020; Wilson Hunt, 2020). Following these arguments and the many examples available in the literature, we can derive that:

Hypothesis 2. *After the reception of collective awards, high-status team members (stars) experience a greater positive status shift than team members that do not have a high-status (non-stars).*

When a high-status individual is part of a collective award-winning team, the audience processes both the team composition and the award jointly, with heightened attention to the high-status member, whose presence generates increased arousal. While on the one hand this arousal implies a greater focus on the star, on the other hand it also facilitates the encoding of the entire package of information in collective memory, enhancing the long-term retention of information about the collective achievement, also for non-star members.

Unlike memories for neutral stimuli that decrease over time, research suggests that the presence of arousing stimuli leads to more durable memories, as arousal enhances the consolidation of information (Baddeley, 1982; Henson et al., 2016; Mickley Steinmetz, Schmidt, Zucker, & Kensinger, 2012). For example, Kleinsmith and Kaplan (1963) demonstrated that individuals recall more items when paired with arousing stimuli. This leads to enhancing the long-term memory of these stimuli, consequently favoring their consolidation (e.g. McGaugh 2000; 2018). This effect is also observed in group dynamics, where the discussion surrounding high-status individuals can trigger more attention and memory consolidation (Kersten & Janssen, 2017; Simcoe & Waguespack, 2011; Weimann, 1983). For instance, Simcoe and Waguespack (2011) demonstrated that high-status individuals likely elicit extra discussion about collective outputs, as in the case of electronic academic publications. This increasing discussion results in additional stimuli that the reference social group processes, and consequently it helps keeping more vivid the memory about the collective output. Thus, the repetitive discussion about the team's success allows peripheral details, including the status of non-stars, to remain in collective memory (Turtle & Yuille, 1994; Montoya et al., 2017). According to this mechanism, high-status individuals can play a relevant role in the reference social group memory consolidation, through the provision of additional stimuli related to the reception of collective awards. These individuals, being able to access valuable resource (Belliveau et al., 1996), can trigger discussion by providing additional information about the collective output, e.g. by leveraging on their press coverage (Kersten & Janssen, 2017; Weimann, 1983). Repeated exposure to stimuli not only helps to consolidate memory but also broadens the focus of attention to include previously peripheral details (Smith, 1896). While high-status individuals benefit most from the arousal created, the entire team's memory of the event becomes more vivid and enduring, affecting even non-stars. Taken together, these arguments may suggest that status shifts are more durable when a high-status individual is a member of the team endorsed with collective awards. In other words, emotional arousal not only enhances the encoding of central details but also improves the retrieval of peripheral details, making the status shift more persistent for all team members (Ochsner, 2000).

In line with this view, the literature has shown that undergoing to a repeated stimulus over time not only helps in consolidating the memory (Smith, 1896), but also allows group members to broaden their attention to the peripheral information, in a process of collecting additional details (e.g. Turtle and Yuille, 1994; Montoya et al., 2017). This is, for instance, the case of students who are able to remember more details of a text if they are asked to read it repeatedly (Penno et al., 2002), customers who recall additional details of a product with a complex design if they are exposed to its advertising several times (Cox and Cox, 2002), or individuals who are able to remember additional details if exposed repeatedly to the same videotape (Turtle and Yuille, 1994). Following the above argumentation, we can expect that:

Hypothesis 3. *The presence of a high-status member in a team extends the persistence of positive status shifts following the reception of collective awards for all team members.*

3. Methodology

3.1. Data and setting

The film industry was deemed as a suitable setting to test our hypotheses. Indeed, film industry is typically used to thoroughly understand the dynamics connected with individuals' status (e.g. Perretti and Negro, 2006; Waguespack and Sorenson, 2011), being this industry characterized by the paramount role of high-status individuals (i.e. star actors), that may strongly affect the success (or the failure) of a film (Elberse, 2007). Moreover, we are particularly interested in the effect of collective awards on team members' status within the social system defined by the audience of the film industry. Actually, the film industry, with specific reference to the Hollywood film industry, is characterized by the assignment of a number of highly regarded collective awards (Cattani, et al. 2013), often conferred during worldwide broadcasted ceremonies. Therefore, we can directly investigate how these awards affect the status of individuals. Additionally, the richness and the level of detail of data and information about individuals and teams working on projects (i.e. films) allows us to accurately analyze the elements influencing the status shift of individuals.

To collect data and information about individuals and films, we mainly relied on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb). IMDb is an extensive online database, owned by Amazon, which, as for January 2025, contains data on about 700,000 feature films and 14 million individuals working in the film industry. Due to its extensiveness, IMDb has been used in many scientific papers dealing with different research streams (e.g. Hsu et al., 2012; Cattani et al., 2013; Jensen and Kim, 2015; Mannucci, 2017; Han and Ravid, 2020). Specifically, we collected data about films produced by the eight major film studios (i.e. 20th Century Fox, DreamWorks, MGM, Paramount, Sony, Universal, Warner Bros., and Walt Disney). Major film studios produce and distribute a great number of films per year, and they are endowed with great stocks of financial, human, and organizational resources. Differently, independent film studios are smaller organizations that may have a lower availability of resources, that may consequently affect the dynamics of production and distribution of films. Accordingly, we consider that major film studios may offer a greater diffusion to their films compared with independent film studios, especially in the period considered in our analysis (2000–2013). Therefore, we focused exclusively on films produced by major film studios to have a homogenous sample in terms of availability and allocation of resources that, in turn, affect the diffusion of the film to the audience. Furthermore, by focusing only on films produced by major film studios, we are confident that the films in our sample have the potential to reach a broad audience and are not affected by limited release.

Moreover, we selected films that were released in cinemas between 2000 and 2013. This specific time interval was chosen to reflect the rising of the digital cinema technology and to avoid spurious effects due to the subsequent widespread diffusion of streaming services as Netflix (which started streaming direct-to-video content and to produce its own original content in 2013) and Amazon PrimeVideo. Accordingly, we retrieved a list of 2,015 films. Noticeably, we removed animation films from our database, since they are characterized by the fact that actors' role is generally limited to dubbing and, therefore, different mechanisms in status definition may be in place respect to other film genres. Additionally, we also removed films that do not report the USA as one of the production countries, being our study focused on Hollywood film industry. We sourced technical details about these films (e.g. runtime, genres, countries of production) from IMDb, as well as information on the awards received. However, market and financial information were obtained from the online database Box Office Mojo (e.g. Mainemelis

et al., 2015), which is a subsidiary of IMDb, thus reducing inconsistency issues. At the end of this process, and after removing films characterized by missing information, the final sample consisted in 1,411 films.

Afterwards, for each film, we retrieved the list of the main actors from IMDb by extracting the first five actors reported in the film record. Indeed, IMDb usually reports the cast list in the credits order, in which main actors are typically listed earlier. Accordingly, by selecting a sample of the first five actors listed for each film, we generally include the actors interpreting the main roles, thus, getting the highest prominence in the film and, often, the longest screen time (Rossman et al., 2010). This choice allowed to include in the sample the actors that the viewers may more likely associate with the related film. For example, with reference to the movie *Avengers: Endgame*, the first five actors listed by IMDb are Robert Downey Jr., Chris Evans, Mark Ruffalo, Chris Hemsworth, and Scarlett Johansson, accounting for the first four positions and for the sixth position in terms of longest screen time (Kim, 2020).

Therefore, after checking for different spelling of names by using the IMDb unique identifier for actors, we built a database with 3,865 unique individuals, whose information about status, filmography, awards received, sex, and age were sourced from IMDb. In conclusion, the films and the actors' databases were merged, generating a final sample made of 6,632 actor-film pairs without missing information, on which we tested our hypotheses.

3.2. Variables

Dependent Variables. Our dependent variables are based on measuring the individual status shift. To evaluate the status of an actor, we relied on the STARMeter measure, developed and provided by IMDb, which has been validated by several previous scientific articles (e.g. Hermosilla, Gutiérrez-Navratil, & Prieto-Rodríguez, 2018; Karniouchina, 2011b; Mathys, Burmesterm, & Clement, 2016; Montañés, Suárez-Vázquez, & Quevedo, 2014). The STARMeter is used as a prompt proxy for the status of actors and other technical roles, since it is calculated, on a weekly basis, by analyzing the behavior and interest of IMDb users – that can be associated with film audience – towards people working in the film industry. The STARMeter basically represents a ranking, where a value equal to one pertains to the highest status individual, while higher values indicate a lower-status. Moreover, to account for the rising levels of competition in the ranking when approaching top positions and the growing difficulties high-status individuals face to further increase their status (e.g. Smirnova et al., 2022), we opt to transform the ordinal scale into an interval scale (Harwell and Gatti, 2001). Therefore, we log-transformed the STARMeter values to favor a more accurate representation of the status shift (Harwell and Gatti, 2001; Karniouchina, 2011a). Specifically, in our study we are interested in the shift of actors' status in response to the achievement of a collective award, hence we focus on the difference between two values of STARMeter referring to different instants of time. In particular, the most relevant awards in film industry were mainly assigned, for the reference period, between December of the same release year of the film (year t) and March of the following calendar year (year $t + 1$). In fact, the awards considered were assigned, for the period of study, no earlier than November 26th (22nd Gotham Awards – 2012) and no later than March 25th (73rd Academy Awards – 2001). Therefore, we measured the short-term status shift (*StatusShiftST*) to test *Hypotheses 1 and 2*, as the difference between the logarithm of the STARMeter value referring to the last week of March (year $t + 1$), i.e. the end of the awards assignment period, and the one referring to the week of the premiere release of the film in the US cinemas (year t). For instance, if an actor takes part on a film released in the first week of June 2001, we measured *StatusShiftST* as the difference between the natural logarithms of the values of the actor's STARMeter in the last week of March 2002 and in the first week of June 2001. Differently, to account for the persistence of the status, as in *Hypothesis 3*, we measured the

long-term status shift (*StatusShiftLT*) as the difference between the logarithm of the STARMeter referring to the last week of March of the year following the awards assignment (year $t + 2$), and the one related to the week of the premier release of the film in the US (year t). Notably, to favor the interpretation of the results, we invert both *StatusShiftST* and *StatusShiftLT*, such that a positive value of the dependent variables indicates an increase in status (i.e. the individual's STARMeter ranking improved), instead a negative value suggests a decrease in status.

Independent Variable. As independent variable, we counted the number of collective awards won by a film (*AwardsWon*). Specifically, we considered only collective awards given to the film and not to individuals. Following Cattani et al. (2013), we collected data on awards assigned by the following professional societies: the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, the Screen Actor Guild, the Independent Feature Project/West societies, the Hollywood Foreign Press Association, the National Board of Review, the National Society of Film Critics, the New York Film Critics Circle, the Los Angeles Film Critics Association, the Broadcast Film Critics Association, the Chicago Film Critics Association, and the Boston Society of Film Critics. These awards are based on the judgment of a wide number of experts and professionals in the film industry (Cattani et al., 2013). Additionally, we also considered the most prominent European awards, such as the British Academy Film Awards (BAFTA) and the Golden Bear (Berlin International Film Festival). For homogeneity reasons, we had to exclude two relevant European awards as the Golden Lion (Venice Film Festival) and the Palme d'Or (Cannes Film Festival), since they are assigned in September and May, respectively, with slightly different participation rules respect to the other awards considered. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the full list of the awards considered.

Moderating Variables. To test our *Hypotheses 2 and 3* we relied on different moderating variables. The moderating variable used to test *Hypothesis 2* indicates if an individual is deemed as having a notably high-status; in other words, if the actor is deemed as a star in the film industry. We measured this variable as a dummy (*Star*), assuming value one if the individual is considered as a star and zero otherwise. We based our *Star* measure on that developed by Cattani et al. (2013), which is grounded on the participation of individuals to commercially successful films. This choice is consistent with Kehoe et al.'s (2018) study, according to which status stars are associated with exceptional and visible task performance. While not the unique possibility, we believe that commercial success is associated with both the features of being easily visible to the audience and being associated with exceptional performances. Specifically, an individual is deemed a star in a given year t , if in the previous four years (i.e. between $t-4$ and $t-1$) the same individual acted in, at least, two films that are in the list of the ten worldwide top-grossing films. In this way, we have a measure that is not related to the social system of the film audience (i.e. the STARMeter), hence we avoid potential correlations between dependent and moderating variables that could bias our results. In other words, using the STARMeter to identify stars would imply that both the moderating and the dependent variables would be both based on the STARMeter, with the risk of having an unobserved factor (e.g. a confounding variable) influencing both variables and thus generating biases. Moreover, using a dummy variable allows for a highly and objectively selected group of individuals to be deemed as stars, avoiding the use of a continuous variable that may make it difficult testing the hypotheses and interpreting the results.

We tested *Hypothesis 2* considering the effect of the interaction between the moderating and the independent variable (*AwardsWon_Star*) on the short-term status shift (*StatusShiftST*). To verify *Hypothesis 3*, we calculated a moderating variable to account for the presence of stars in the actors' team (*StarTeam*). This is also a dummy variable, assuming value one if at least a star is part of the team and zero otherwise. The effect of the interaction between *StarTeam* and the independent variable (*AwardsWon_StarTeam*) on the long-term status shift (*StatusShiftLT*) is used to test *Hypothesis 3*.

Control Variables. We added to our model several control variables to

account both for actor and film characteristics, hence identifying an individual and a team level.

At the individual level (i.e. actor), we added a variable to account for the actor's career seniority (*CareerSeniority*), measured as the number of years elapsed between the year of the focal film release and the year of the individual's entering in the film industry, to control for possible age-related effects on status shift. Moreover, we added a dummy variable for the actor's sex (*Sex*), assuming value one if the actor is a male, and zero if the actor is female. We also included a dummy variable (*US_Nat*) assuming value one if the actor has American nationality, zero otherwise. With this variable we control for the fact that non-American actors involved in a foreign industry may be affected by different status formation dynamics or differently hit the audience with respect to American actors. Additionally, since the previous individual awards won by an actor may affect the expectations of the public on the same actor's performance and, conversely, the status shift, we controlled for the individual awards won in the five years up to the year of release of the focal film (*IndAwards_Prev*). The choice of measuring this variable with reference to the five years up to the focal film release allows accounting for forgetting effects that may limit the impact of events happened in a distant year. Moreover, we also controlled for the outstanding performance of an actor, by counting the number of individual awards received in the year following the release of the focal film (*IndAwards*). For homogeneity reasons, the individual awards considered in the measuring of these two variables are those assigned by the same associations and festivals that we selected for the independent variable. Furthermore, we accounted for the appearances of an actor in other films released in the five years preceding the release of the focal film (*ActorExp*), since other appearances in films may, enforce the audience's memory mechanisms and influence their perception. We measured the number of films to which the individual participated and released in the same year of the focal film (*ActorFilm_t*) and released in the following year (*ActorFilm_t1*), to account for potential influences of other actor-related signals reaching the film audience, that may affect memory mechanisms. Moreover, a control variable (*OtherStars*) accounts for the presence of other stars within the team of actors taking part in the movie along with the focal actor. We also added a further control variable (*Order*) accounting for the position of the focal actor in the actors' list for each film (i.e. a value of *Order* equal to one indicates that the actor is the first in the cast order). Finally, we included a control variable measuring the status of the focal actor when the film was released (*InitialStatus*), to account for potential effects related to the initial level of individual's status. This variable was calculated as the natural logarithm of the focal actor's STARMeter in the week of release of the film.

At the team level (i.e. film), we controlled for the runtime in minutes (*Runtime*) and for the number of days of release in theaters (*Release*). Moreover, we controlled for the financial performance of the film, by measuring the natural logarithm of the gross US box office in US\$ (*GrossBO*) and the natural logarithm of the production budget in US\$ (*Budget*). Furthermore, we also included a variable accounting for the number of different countries where the companies producing the film are based (*Countries*). Additionally, we included dummy variables referring to the 18 film genres in the IMDb classification (*Genre*), and to the year (*Year*) and month (*Month*) of release. In particular, it is relevant to evaluate the month of release, since the film industry is influenced by seasonal effects (Einaiv, 2007).

3.3. Estimation Method

Our hypotheses were tested using multilevel or hierarchical linear regression models, since the dependent variables are continuous and not limited and our sample is made by individuals nested in teams. Accordingly, we performed the analyses using two-levels nested models, where the first level regression includes individual-related variables, and the second level regression includes the team-related variables. Additionally, the Huber-White robust standard errors were applied to

estimate the significance levels, in order to avoid heteroskedasticity issues (Wooldridge, 2012). The analyses were performed on the whole sample. Model 1 represents the baseline model, including only the effects of control variables on *StatusShiftST*, while in Models 2 and 3 the independent variable and its interaction with the moderating variable (*AwardsWon_Star*) are added, respectively. Similarly, Model 4 represents the baseline model, adding only the effects of control variables on *StatusShiftLT*, while Models 5 and 6 include the independent variable and the moderating effect (*AwardsWon_StarTeam*), respectively. *Hypotheses 1 and 2* were tested on Model 3, while *Hypothesis 3* was tested on Model 6. Specifically, to test *Hypothesis 3* we used the long-term status shift as dependent variable (*StatusShiftLT*). Therefore, Models 4–6, using *StatusShiftLT* as dependent variable, allow to analyze which variables included in the models are statistically related to an increase (or decrease) of the focal actor's status that extends in time. Finally, we checked for potential multicollinearity issues estimating the variance inflation factor (VIF) indexes in Model 3 and 6 and the tests revealed that the maximum value of the VIFs is about three, thus well below the commonly accepted threshold of 10 (Kleinbaum et al., 1998). Accordingly, risks of multicollinearity are avoided, eventually increasing the reliability of our results.

4. Results

Tables 1a and b present descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations, with significance levels, among the variables included in our individual- and team-level models, respectively. In particular, the magnitude of significant pairwise correlations values are lower than the threshold of 0.70 for the variables included in the same models, therefore reducing multicollinearity issues.

In Table 2, we present the results of the linear regressions on *StatusShiftST*. Model 1 is the baseline model, showing that being a star ($\beta = 0.3828$, $p < 0.001$), the career seniority of the actor ($\beta = 0.0022$, $p < 0.05$), being American ($\beta = 0.0627$, $p < 0.10$), winning individual awards in the five years up to the release of the focal film ($\beta = 0.0646$, $p < 0.001$) and in the year following the release of the focal film ($\beta = 0.4733$, $p < 0.001$), acting in other films in the previous five years ($\beta = 0.0111$, $p < 0.001$) and in the same year of the focal film ($\beta = 0.0209$, $p < 0.05$), having a lower-status when the film was released ($\beta = 0.3140$, $p < 0.001$), the runtime of the film ($\beta = 0.0025$, $p < 0.10$), and the number of days the focal film was screened in theaters ($\beta = 0.0034$, $p < 0.001$) are related with an increase of status. Differently, being male ($\beta = -0.1006$, $p < 0.001$), the presence of other stars in the cast ($\beta = -0.0993$, $p < 0.10$), being listed later in the actors' list ($\beta = -0.0915$, $p < 0.001$), and the gross box office of the film ($\beta = -0.0502$, $p < 0.01$) are related with a decrease of the focal actor's status. In Model 2, we added the effect of the independent variable *AwardsWon*, while Model 3 is the full model in which we included the interaction between *AwardsWon* and the moderating variable *Star*. As previously mentioned, we tested *Hypotheses 1 and 2* on Model 3.

Model 3 confirms both *Hypotheses 1 and 2*. Specifically, *Hypothesis 1* states that when a team gets collective awards, all the cast members increase their status. Indeed, we found that the coefficient of the independent variable *Awards_Won* is statistically significant and positive ($\beta = 0.0838$, $p < 0.10$). This means that receiving collective awards positively shifts the status of the actors that participated to the film, consistently with our prediction. Moreover, *Hypothesis 2* states that the status shift due to the winning of collective awards is higher for stars compared with non-stars. We found support also for this hypothesis in Model 3. In fact, the coefficient of the interaction term *AwardsWon_Star* is statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction ($\beta = 0.2567$, $p < 0.001$), hence indicating that high-status individuals, such as stars, get an additional positive status shift because of winning collective awards, respect to low-status actors.

To provide more insights on the interaction effect, we performed a simple slope analysis and plotted the individual level regression results

Table 1a
Individual-level descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations.

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. StatusShiftST	0.678***													
2. StatusShiftLT	-0.035**	-0.031*												
3. Star	0.059***	0.060***	0.037**											
4. CareerSeniority	0.032**	0.054***	0.055***	0.151***										
5. Sex	0.026**	0.046***	-0.003	-0.036**	-0.053**									
6. US Nat	0.050**	0.003	0.054***	0.139***	-0.061***	0.023†								
7. IndAwards_Prev	0.190***	0.063***	0.011	0.057***	-0.023†	0.018	0.249***							
8. IndAwards	0.035**	0.058***	0.026**	0.201***	0.094***	0.031*	0.030**	0.008						
9. ActorsExp	0.042***	0.047***	-0.042	0.099***	0.097***	0.002	-0.039**	-0.002	0.457***					
10. ActorFiln_t	0.072***	0.112***	-0.020	-0.064***	0.097***	0.010	-0.032**	-0.013	0.441***	0.390***				
11. ActorFiln_t1	-0.059***	-0.060***	0.102***	0.031*	0.010	-0.057***	0.048***	0.047***	0.036**	0.012	0.008			
12. OtherStars	0.077***	0.112***	-0.100**	-0.014	0.018	-0.043**	-0.087***	-0.087***	0.054***	0.058***	0.010	0.058***		
13. Order	0.452***	0.475***	-0.164***	-0.018	0.130***	-0.033**	-0.208***	-0.115**	-0.067***	-0.006	0.010	-0.082***	0.386***	
14. InitialStatus	-0.623	-0.846	0.021	18.367	0.660	0.709	0.419	0.098	10.940	3.064	2.240	0.080	2.904	5.479
Mean	1.337	1.408	0.142	12.689	0.474	0.454	1.259	0.518	6.852	1.842	1.866	0.302	1.392	2.191
Standard Deviation	-5.989	-6.173	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.693
Min	6.953	5.993	1	80	1	1	13	7	65	28	16	4	5	14.585
Max														

n = 6,632; †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

in Fig. 1 (Aiken and West, 1991; Dawson, 2014). Specifically, for Hypothesis 2, we assessed the variation of status due to the victory of collective prizes for high- and low-status individuals, corresponding to star and non-star actors, respectively. As depicted in Fig. 1, the positive effects due to winning collective prizes are higher for high-status members (simple slope $b = 0.341$, $p = 0.057$) respect to low-status members (simple slope $b = 0.084$, $p = 0.000$). These results suggest that the higher the number of collective awards won, the higher the difference in status shift between the two groups, providing additional confirmation to Hypothesis 2.

In Table 3, we report the results for the multilevel linear regressions on *StatusShiftLT*. Model 4 refers to the baseline model, in which we included only the control variables. Model 4 shows that the career seniority of an individual ($\beta = 0.0040$, $p < 0.01$), having US nationality ($\beta = 0.1064$, $p < 0.01$), the individual awards won in the five years up to the release of the focal film ($\beta = 0.0607$, $p < 0.001$) and in the year following its release ($\beta = 0.2356$, $p < 0.001$), the number of film in which the individual participated both in the five years up to the release of the focal film ($\beta = 0.0085$, $p < 0.01$) and in the year following its release ($\beta = 0.0786$, $p < 0.001$), having a lower-status when the focal film was released ($\beta = 0.3263$, $p < 0.001$), and the number of days the focal film was screened in theaters ($\beta = 0.0015$, $p < 0.05$) have a positive effect on the persistence of the status shift in the long-term. Differently, being male ($\beta = -0.0687$, $p < 0.05$), being reported in a lower position in the actors' list ($\beta = -0.0783$, $p < 0.001$), and a higher value of the gross box office ($\beta = -0.0780$, $p < 0.001$) have a negative effect on the individual's status in the long-term.

Model 6 shows support for Hypothesis 3. In fact, the coefficient of the interaction term *AwardsWon_StarTeam* is consistent with the hypothesized direction ($\beta = 0.2301$, $p < 0.10$). This means that individuals that are part of a team that won collective awards and including at least one star experience a positive status shift in the long-term.

To verify the robustness of our findings, we performed additional tests. First, to provide further confirmation to Hypothesis 2, we split the sample between high-status individuals (i.e. those identified as stars) and low-status individuals (i.e. non-stars) and we ran two different regression analyses. These showed that the coefficient of the *Won* variable (i.e. the independent variable in our study) is 1.019 ($p < 0.05$) for Stars, while 0.083 ($p < 0.05$) for non-stars. This difference is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ (z-value equal to 4.544). Hence, the effect of each collective award won is much higher for stars, than for non-stars, further confirming our hypothesis.

We also tested effects related with the affiliation to a star director to provide more robustness to our findings. To account for the presence of star directors we used the same measure proposed by Cattani et al. (2013), which was previously leveraged to define star actors. Hence, we added to the regression models a control dummy variable (*StarDirector*), assuming value one if the film was directed by a star director and zero otherwise. The regression models showed that the variable is not significant.

Additionally, in the main analysis we chose to control for the individual awards won in the previous five years to account for forgetting effects that may limit the impact of events happened in a distant year. However, we ran further regressions using the total number of individual awards won, rather than limiting the count to the last five years. These tests fully confirm the results of the main analysis.

Moreover, we ran linear regression models using clustering across actors with robust standard errors. Also in this case the results in the main analysis are fully supported. The results of main analysis are fully supported even using clustering across films with robust standard errors. Finally, we tested the hypotheses through a panel data linear regression based on longitudinal data on actors, even though the panel is strongly unbalanced. However, with this test only Hypotheses 1 and 2 are confirmed. Overall, these additional robustness tests provide further reliability to our analysis.

Table 1b

Team-level descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations.

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. AwardsWon							
2. StarTeam	−0.018						
3. Runtime	0.202***	0.171***					
4. Release	0.253***	0.113***	0.285***				
5. GrossBO	0.079**	0.174***	0.305***	0.510***			
6. Budget	−0.012	0.212***	0.437***	0.163***	0.574***		
7. Countries	0.015	0.029	0.123***	0.020	−0.039	0.091***	
Mean	0.079	0.088	109.90	94.675	17.351	17.351	1.499
Standard Deviation	0.541	0.283	18.463	42.421	1.433	1.002	0.670
Min	0	0	78	3	5.820	9.616	1
Max	8	1	219	371	20.435	19.519	3

n = 1,411; †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Table 2

Multilevel linear regression models for short-term status shifts.

Dependent Variable: StatusShiftST	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
AwardsWon		0.0853 [†] (0.0441)	0.0838 [†] (0.0440)
AwardsWon_Star			0.2567*** (0.0687)
Star	0.3828*** (0.0895)	0.3903*** (0.0894)	0.3787*** (0.0909)
Individual level control variables (level 1 regression)			
CareerSeniority	0.0022* (0.0010)	0.0022* (0.0010)	0.0022* (0.0010)
Sex	−0.1006*** (0.0296)	−0.1017*** (0.0296)	−0.1018*** (0.0296)
US_Nat	0.0627 [†] (0.0333)	0.0616 [†] (0.0333)	0.0612 [†] (0.0333)
IndAwards_Prev	0.0646*** (0.0117)	0.0641*** (0.0117)	0.0643*** (0.0117)
IndAwards	0.4733*** (0.0325)	0.4692*** (0.0325)	0.4694*** (0.0326)
ActorsExp	0.0111*** (0.0023)	0.0112*** (0.0023)	0.0111*** (0.0023)
ActorFilm_t	0.0209* (0.0083)	0.0207* (0.0083)	0.0207* (0.0083)
OtherStars	−0.0993 [†] (0.0567)	−0.0916 (0.0569)	−0.0911 (0.0568)
Order	−0.0915*** (0.0109)	−0.0917*** (0.0109)	−0.0917*** (0.0109)
InitialStatus	0.3140*** (0.0096)	0.3140*** (0.0096)	0.3140*** (0.0096)
Team level control variables (level 2 regression)			
Runtime	0.0025 [†] (0.0014)	0.0022 (0.0014)	0.0022 (0.0014)
Release	0.0034*** (0.0006)	0.0031*** (0.0006)	0.0031*** (0.0006)
GrossBO	−0.0502** (0.0195)	−0.0497* (0.0195)	−0.0498* (0.0195)
Budget	−0.0338 (0.034)	−0.0312 (0.0345)	−0.0311 (0.0345)
Countries	0.0231 (0.0281)	0.0235 (0.0281)	0.0234 (0.0281)
Genre dummies	Included	Included	Included
Year dummies	Included	Included	Included
Month dummies	Included	Included	Included
Intercept	−1.8457*** (0.5088)	−1.8487*** (0.5101)	−1.8505*** (0.5101)
χ^2	3018.22***	3008.86***	3007.51***
Log-likelihood	−9961.59	−9962.18	−9961.17

Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

5. Discussion and conclusion

Extant research has extensively examined individual status shifts, highlighting that affiliation with high-status individuals or organizations (e.g. Long et al., 1998; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) and third-

party evaluations (e.g. Zhao and Zhou, 2011; Jensen and Kim, 2015) are key drivers of status increases. However, less attention has been paid to status dynamics at the team level. This paper contributes to filling this gap by offering new theoretical insights into how both external recognition (the reception of the collective award) and internal team composition (affiliation or not with high-status individuals) jointly influence status shifts. Specifically, we argue that external recognition triggers status shifts, while the internal composition of the team shapes the individual impact of these shifts on team members. We ground our conceptualization in the idea that team composition, especially the presence of high-status individuals, exposes the social group to emotional arousal stimuli. This emotional arousal influences both the magnitude of status shifts and their persistence over time.

Our analysis is based on the film industry, which is characterized by the presence of working teams (i.e. the cast of a film) including actors with different status, and by the practice of granting trustworthy collective awards, thus allowing to investigate the concurrent effect of the two stimuli above mentioned. Our findings indicate that winning collective awards generates a positive status shift in team members, hence confirming the presence of an emotional arousal stimulus due to reception of public recognition awarded by a trustworthy third-party (Jensen and Kim, 2015). However, results also suggest that stars experience a positive status shift in response to winning a collective award with respect to non-stars. This could be explained by considering that, in the presence of an emotional arousal stimulus, the attention of a social group is mainly focused on the stars, that capture the group's interest and receive a greater share of recognition for the awarding of a collective prize, thus relatively neglecting the presence of lower-status teammates (Verhulst et al., 2010). In other words, social groups selectively concentrate on the performance of the stars, so that information related to their acting is encoded and stored, eventually contributing to the positive status shift (Robinson, 1995). In turn, information on the performance of low-status (i.e. non-star) actors is peripheral to the social group and it is partially disregarded (Easterbrook, 1959), such that it is not completely encoded in memory and generates a relatively smaller positive status shift. Finally, we tested the persistence of these status shifts in the long-term. Our results indicate that the positive status shift last in time only when an actor is part of a team concurrently winning a collective award and including at least a high-status individual. The analysis highlights that this may be possible only when both stimuli are provided, hence offering an intense emotional arousal that persists in the memory of social groups. Moreover, our results point out that when these stimuli are not concurrently provided (i.e. a winning team without any star or having at least a star in a not winning team), they may not be so vivid to be consolidated in the social group (McGaugh, 2000) and their memory may start to fade when new stimuli, as the assignment of other awards for other projects, are provided. Indeed, winning collective awards and having (at least) a star within the team may enforce each other and call a longer attentional focus from the film audience that may affect also peripheral details (Ochsner, 2000). Accordingly, these stimuli




Fig. 1. The relationship between status variation and winning collective awards.

may last longer in the film audience memory and positively affect the status of all the team members, regardless of their status. From the perspective of low-status individuals this is a further advantage of being associated with high-status ones (Long et al., 1998; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999).

5.1. Theoretical implications

Our study makes several key theoretical contributions. First, we extend the status literature by examining the dynamics of status shifts at the team level. We show that affiliation with high-status individuals and the receipt of collective awards have complementary effects on status shifts. Specifically, we argue that external recognition triggers status shifts, while team composition shapes how these shifts impact individual team members. In this way, our paper highlights a sequential process of status accrual at the team level: the first step involves processing external recognition as a spotlight, while the second step focuses on distributing the resulting status shifts among team members.

Second, we integrate two perspectives that have traditionally been studied separately: the relational (Long et al., 1998; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) and public recognition (Zhao and Zhou, 2011; Jensen and Kim, 2015) perspectives. Our study is one of the few (e.g. Rossman et al., 2010) examining their concurrent effects. In doing so, we offer a new explanation for why high- and low-status teams are formed. While existing literature suggests that high-status individuals avoid affiliating with lower-status peers to protect their own status (Jensen, 2008), empirical evidence also shows that forming hetero-status partnerships can allow high-status individuals to strategically exchange status for other resources (e.g. Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Messeni Petruzzelli, 2019). Our findings extend this discourse by revealing that high-status individuals may engage in such partnerships because collaborating with lower-status team members in a winning team enables the high-status individual to appropriate the majority of credit for the team's success, thereby capturing a larger positive status shift, regardless of the contributions made by lower-status individuals. Simultaneously for low-status team members the affiliation with the high-status ones may be motivated by the attempt to obtain long-lasting status shifts.

Relatedly, our work contributes also to literature on status shifts by emphasizing the long-term effects of collective awards. While previous research has primarily focused on the short-term impact of status

changes, our findings suggest that the long-term effects of status shifts can be significantly influenced by the emotional arousal induced by the presence of a star in the team. Our results highlight that intense stimuli due to positive events may persist in the memory of social groups, allowing the status shifts last longer. Accordingly, low-status individuals associated with high-status ones may get, in the short-term, a smaller share of the credit when winning a collective prize, but in turn the positive status shifts they get may last longer, allowing them to ripe the benefit of their condition also in the long-term.

5.2. Practical implications

Our findings may inspire also several practical implications. First, firms more and more employ working teams in their organizational structure (Beersma et al., 2003). Therefore, understanding how the status of employees working in teams is defined may be particularly interesting to better tailor incentive schemes and human resource management practices, being these increasingly crafted on the employees' status (Blau, 1977; Rosenbaum, 1979; Lazear, 2004; Bidwell et al., 2015). In particular, it may be relevant to understand how the perception of the contribution provided by each employee is affected by the individual's status and avoid organizations to provide individuals with rewards beyond their actual contribution. Second, our findings may also be relevant for individuals, influencing their affiliation choices. In fact, we suggest that positive status shifts may vary according to the achievements of the team and its composition. Therefore, low-status individuals may benefit from being part of collective awards winning team. However, they should be careful to the presence of high-status individuals, who may appropriate most of the credits for the awards. Nonetheless, a positive increase in status, lasting also in the longer term, may help low-status individuals in getting a better job or a higher wage. Conversely, our findings indicate that it may make sense for high-status individuals partnering with lower-status fellows since, in case the team receives collective awards, they tend to get more credits and achieve a greater status shift. Summarizing, in both cases individuals should be careful to the choice of partners, since this may influence their status shift and, consequently, their possibilities to get the advantages of a high-status condition.

Table 3

Multilevel linear regression models for long-term status shifts.

Dependent Variable: StatusShiftLT	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>AwardsWon</i>		−0.0383 (0.0292)	−0.0451 (0.0291)
<i>AwardsWon_StarTeam</i>			0.2301 [†] (0.1350)
<i>StarTeam</i>	0.0638 (0.0602)	0.0595 (0.0604)	0.0475 (0.0609)
Individual level control variables (level 1 regression)			
<i>CareerSeniority</i>	0.0040** (0.0013)	0.0039** (0.0013)	0.0040** (0.0013)
<i>Sex</i>	−0.0687* (0.0329)	−0.0681* (0.0329)	−0.0683* (0.0329)
<i>US_Nat</i>	0.1064** (0.0362)	0.1070** (0.0362)	0.1074** (0.0362)
<i>IndAwards_Prev</i>	0.0607*** (0.0134)	0.0610*** (0.0134)	0.0602*** (0.0134)
<i>IndAwards</i>	0.2356*** (0.0333)	0.2379*** (0.0335)	0.2376*** (0.0334)
<i>ActorsExp</i>	0.0085** (0.0027)	0.0084** (0.0027)	0.0084** (0.0027)
<i>ActorFilm_t</i>	−0.0047 (0.0089)	−0.0047 (0.0089)	−0.0046 (0.0089)
<i>ActorFilm_t1</i>	0.0786*** (0.0090)	0.0786*** (0.0090)	0.0787*** (0.0090)
<i>Order</i>	−0.0783*** (0.0121)	−0.0781*** (0.0121)	−0.0784*** (0.0121)
<i>InitialStatus</i>	0.3263*** (0.0100)	0.3263*** (0.0099)	0.3265*** (0.0099)
Team level control variables (level 2 regression)			
<i>Runtime</i>	−0.0005 (0.0014)	−0.0003 (0.0014)	−0.0003 (0.0014)
<i>Release</i>	0.0015* (0.0006)	0.0017** (0.0006)	0.0017** (0.0006)
<i>GrossBO</i>	−0.0780*** (0.0193)	−0.0783*** (0.0192)	−0.0787*** (0.0192)
<i>Budget</i>	0.0419 (0.0295)	0.0408 (0.0295)	0.0418 (0.0296)
<i>Countries</i>	−0.0309 (0.0281)	−0.0311 (0.0281)	−0.0311 (0.0280)
<i>Genre dummies</i>	Included	Included	Included
<i>Year dummies</i>	Included	Included	Included
<i>Month dummies</i>	Included	Included	Included
<i>Intercept</i>	−2.4391*** (0.4515)	−2.4387*** (0.4509)	−2.4602*** (0.4518)
χ^2	2329.40***	2327.24***	2325.23
<i>Log-likelihood</i>	−10585.70	−10588.46	−10587.57

Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. [†]p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

5.3. Limitations and further research

This study presents, of course, some limitations that may inspire further research. First of all, our analysis is performed on a specific setting, as the film industry, which is relevant to study the dynamics of status shifts (e.g. Perretti and Negro, 2006; Waguespack and Sorenson, 2011), but may suffer of some setting-specific features that may limit the

generalizability of results. Future research may replicate our study in different settings to provide more reliability to our findings. Moreover, we performed our research on a limited time interval, ranging from 2000 to 2013, which is characterized by the increasing use of digital technologies in the film industry and by an increasing frequency of stimuli provision to the general public. It would be interesting to understand how the frequency of stimuli affects the information processing by social groups and, thus, the dynamics of status shifts. For instance, the study may be replicated in different time intervals, characterized by a lower frequency of stimuli provision. Additionally, in our main analysis we do not consider if the status of the team supervisor (i.e. the director) has an influence on team members' status shifts, nonetheless organizations often appoint a team leader who is responsible for team operations and whose role is recognized by social groups. Hence, further studies may dig deeper into the analysis of the effects of supervisors' status on status shifts dynamics. Similarly, future analyses may focus on investigating if and how the individual's role in a team influences the status shifts dynamics and the peculiar dynamics affecting debutants especially when associated with stars. Furthermore, we selected renowned team awards and, for this reason, we do not weigh their value when calculating the independent variable. Further studies may push forward our research by including more team awards in the analysis and weighing their value according to their features or relevancy. Finally, we focused on a positive event, such as winning collective awards. However, it may be interesting to look at the opposite effect and understand if and how an individual's status changes when being part of a team that achieves a failure, and how this is affected by the composition of the team. Indeed, considering our setting, a different magnitude in the status shift for positive and negative events may also affect the career paths and choice of individuals.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Vincenzo Buttice: Writing – original draft, Visualization, Validation, Methodology, Investigation, Conceptualization. **Angelo Natalicchio**: Writing – original draft, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization. **Antonio Messeni Petruzzelli**: Writing – original draft, Supervision, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Conceptualization.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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Appendix

Table A1
Team awards considered.

Professional Society / Festival	Award
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences	Academy Award – Best Picture
Screen Actor Guild	Outstanding performance by a cast
Independent Feature Project/West societies	Gotham Award
Hollywood Foreign Press Association	Golden Globe – Drama
Hollywood Foreign Press Association	Golden Globe – Musical or Comedy
National Board of Review	Best Film
National Society of Film Critics	Best Film
New York Film Critics Circle	Best Film
Los Angeles Film Critics Association	Best Film
Broadcast Film Critics Association	Best Picture
Chicago Film Critics Association	Best Film
Boston Society of Film Critics	Best Picture
British Academy Film Awards	BAFTA Award for Best Film
Berlin International Film Festival	Golden Bear

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