We propose a framework for multi-issue bilateral negotiation, where issues are expressed and related to each other via Description Logics. Agents' goals are expressed through (complex) concepts, and the worth of goals as weights over concepts, We adopt a very general setting with incomplete information by letting agents keep both goals and worths of goals as private information. We introduce a negotiation protocol for such a setting, and discuss different possible strategies that agents can adopt during the negotiation process. We show that such a protocol converges, if the Description Logic used enjoys the finite implicants property.
|Titolo:||Description Logics for Multi-Issue Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete Information|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2007|
|Nome del convegno:||22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI-07|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||4.1 Contributo in Atti di convegno|