CPU-side comparison for Key Agreement between Tree Parity Machines and standard Cryptographic Primitives

Information Security has become a crucial aspect nowadays in every domains. In order to protect these several domains, various cryptographic primitives have been implemented. To address this issue, in this paper we provide a key contribution. We compare three cryptographic primitives: Tree Parity Machines (TPM), Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and show that TPMs is the best choice, based on cpu-side instructions, to make the key agreement between two counterparts A and B. Regarding DH and ECDH, tests have been performed using authenticated and unauthenticated versions. DH-Unified and Elliptic Curve Fully Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECFHQV) represent the authenticated version of DH and ECDH, respectively. We performed the comparisons for key agreement using programs compiled with a native programming language and a terminal tool to gather statistical information, such as some CPU-side evens, time required for synchronization, and information to be sent to the unsafe channel. Our detailed analysis, both formal and experimental, shows that cpu instruction-side TPM networks are ideal candidates for execute a key agreement between two counterparts A and B.