Physical Layer Security (PLS) is emerging as an innovative solution to enhance the security of wireless communications. This work analyzes the impact of a realistic indoor radio propagation on Secrecy Key Generation (SKG) in a WiFi application scenario. This PLS technique is based on the extraction of raw cryptographic keys, taking advantage of the radio propagation phenomena as a source of entropy. In detail, we considered two legitimate nodes, i.e., Alice and Bob, which use the SKG to extract keys from the channel, and a malicious node, i.e., Eve, which acts as a passive eavesdropper and tries to discover the key. The reported results show that legitimate nodes key mismatch is strongly influenced by noise contribution, and the eavesdropper attack performs better with a higher Line-of-Sight (LoS) contribution. Conversely, when the power is evenly spread over all the multipath components, the eavesdropped key mismatch is maintained in the range of 30 − 50 %.
Effect of Indoor Radio Propagation on Physical Layer Security Secrecy Key Generation / Santorsola, A.; Magno, G.; Petruzzelli, V.; Caporusso, S. R.; Calo', Giovanna. - (2024), pp. 180-181. ( 2024 IEEE INC-USNC-URSI Radio Science Meeting (Joint with AP-S Symposium), INC-USNC-URSI 2024 �Fortezza da Basso� Convention Center, ita 2024) [10.23919/INC-USNC-URSI61303.2024.10632335].
Effect of Indoor Radio Propagation on Physical Layer Security Secrecy Key Generation
Santorsola A.;Magno G.;Petruzzelli V.;Calo Giovanna
2024
Abstract
Physical Layer Security (PLS) is emerging as an innovative solution to enhance the security of wireless communications. This work analyzes the impact of a realistic indoor radio propagation on Secrecy Key Generation (SKG) in a WiFi application scenario. This PLS technique is based on the extraction of raw cryptographic keys, taking advantage of the radio propagation phenomena as a source of entropy. In detail, we considered two legitimate nodes, i.e., Alice and Bob, which use the SKG to extract keys from the channel, and a malicious node, i.e., Eve, which acts as a passive eavesdropper and tries to discover the key. The reported results show that legitimate nodes key mismatch is strongly influenced by noise contribution, and the eavesdropper attack performs better with a higher Line-of-Sight (LoS) contribution. Conversely, when the power is evenly spread over all the multipath components, the eavesdropped key mismatch is maintained in the range of 30 − 50 %.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

