This paper focuses on the optimal scheduling of the charging and discharging strategies of a community energy storage (CES) system, which is shared by the prosumers belonging to a grid-connected energy community. The prosumers own renewable energy sources (RESs), while they can buy/sell their energy imbalance directly from/to the power grid. For the sake of increasing the penetration of RESs and reducing the operating cost, prosumers leverage on the shared CES: in particular, each user can only employ a portion of the overall CES charge/discharge profile. Differently from the related literature, where storage devices are individually owned and the battery degradation aspects are typically disregarded, we propose a novel control mechanism based on noncooperative game theory, which allows users to minimize their energy cost as well as concur on the CES resources allocation with minimal-degradation. The effectiveness of the method is validated through numerical experiments on a realistic case study, where a shared CES supplies energy to the local community of residential prosumers. Finally, the comparison with a centralized control approach shows that the proposed framework allows all prosumers to achieve a fair cost-optimal utilization of the shared CES.
A Decentralized Noncooperative Control Approach for Sharing Energy Storage Systems in Energy Communities / Calefati, M.; Proia, S.; Scarabaggio, P.; Carli, R.; Dotoli, M.. - (2021), pp. 1430-1435. (Intervento presentato al convegno 2021 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC 2021 tenutosi a aus nel 2021) [10.1109/SMC52423.2021.9658851].
A Decentralized Noncooperative Control Approach for Sharing Energy Storage Systems in Energy Communities
Calefati M.;Proia S.;Scarabaggio P.;Carli R.;Dotoli M.
2021-01-01
Abstract
This paper focuses on the optimal scheduling of the charging and discharging strategies of a community energy storage (CES) system, which is shared by the prosumers belonging to a grid-connected energy community. The prosumers own renewable energy sources (RESs), while they can buy/sell their energy imbalance directly from/to the power grid. For the sake of increasing the penetration of RESs and reducing the operating cost, prosumers leverage on the shared CES: in particular, each user can only employ a portion of the overall CES charge/discharge profile. Differently from the related literature, where storage devices are individually owned and the battery degradation aspects are typically disregarded, we propose a novel control mechanism based on noncooperative game theory, which allows users to minimize their energy cost as well as concur on the CES resources allocation with minimal-degradation. The effectiveness of the method is validated through numerical experiments on a realistic case study, where a shared CES supplies energy to the local community of residential prosumers. Finally, the comparison with a centralized control approach shows that the proposed framework allows all prosumers to achieve a fair cost-optimal utilization of the shared CES.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.